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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

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THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)

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1. Each oblast, rayon, and city in the USSR had a voyenkomat. In all large cities, such as Leningrad, Kiev, etc, there was a voyenkomat in each division or section. For example, each rayon within Moscow had a rayonkomat, whose activities were controlled by the Moscow Municipal Komisariat. In addition, each oblast had an oblast komisariat which controlled the activities of the voyenkomaty in the entire oblast, including those in the rayony, in the small towns, and in the cities. The military manpower procurement activities of the entire Soviet Union were under the control of these organizations.
2. The voyenkomaty were not responsible for labor recruitment. Persons recruited for labor were usually very young, sometimes as young as ten years of age, and the voyenkomaty were concerned only with individuals 17 years of age or older. Persons called up for labor service were generally recruited for trade schools (remeslenniye uchilishcha), in which they were taught trades and professions.
3. In 1950, the central office for the entire conscription system for the city of Moscow was located in the Moscow Military District headquarters. This conscription office of the Moscow Military District was responsible for and controlled all voyenkomaty and komisariats in Moscow Oblast, the city of Moscow, and the districts of the city of Moscow. All voyenkomaty were directly responsible to this office. This office was large and employed many people (number and details of operation unknown to source).
4. The chairman of each voyenkomat was responsible to the Section on Mobilization of the Moscow Military District, which in turn was responsible to the command of the Moscow Military District.
5. A system similar to that of the Moscow Military District was employed in the other military districts and rayony.

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6. Each voyenkomat had its own mobilization plan and was charged with the task of providing the required number of men for military service in the event of general mobilization. The chief in charge of each voyenkomat was responsible for preparing this mobilization plan. The plan for each voyenkomat was in accordance with the plan of the komat to which it was subordinate, and any modification or alteration of the plan for the cities or districts was incorporated in the plan for each individual voyenkomat.

- 25X1X 7. [] the job of commissioner of a voyenkomat was very important, 25X1A
and that preparation of the mobilization plan was extremely difficult. []
does not recall the name of the office which was at the top of the administrative
25X1A hierarchy for the voyenkomaty, but [] it may have been the Ministry of 25X1A
Defense, and [] this top office made continual checks on the status
of the mobilization plan of each voyenkomat.


8. In the event of a general mobilization in the USSR, [] men 25X1X
between the ages of 17 through 50 would be called into service. This is in
25X1X contrast to the age limitation for normal military service, which embraces
the 18 through 45 age group.

9. [] an increase in military activity within the Soviet Union
can be readily determined by observing the activities in and around the various
voyenkomaty. Any noticeable increase in activity around the voyenkomat, such
as an increased number of persons entering and departing from the offices, may
indicate either a partial or general mobilization. Normally, activities of the
voyenkomaty are constant throughout the year with the exception of the one-
month period from 1 September through 1 October, at which time the annual in-
duction quota for universal military training is filled. Should any activity
similar to that which occurs during the 1 September through 1 October period
be noticed at some other time of the year, [] it would be an 25X1X
indication of Soviet military mobilization.

10. In the event of a general mobilization, the first group of inductees will
probably be taken from the agricultural areas. During World War II the Soviets
learned the importance of keeping qualified factory workers (particularly those
working in strategic industries) on the job. Farm labor requirements could
be filled by old people, by children as young as 10 years of age, or by women,
and, therefore, the loss of persons taken into the military would constitute
less of a hazard to production on the farms than a similar loss would to the
25X1X factories. Therefore, [] any abnormal increase in the number
of farm people seen entering, or active about, the voyenkomat could indicate a
degree of military mobilization.

11. When called to service, inductees reported to a commission of the voyenkomat
which issued the notice of induction. This commission is made up of representa-
tive members of the Soviet Army, Navy, Air Force, MGB, a physician, and those
other military branches concerned. The chairman of the commission was the
civilian commissioner of the voyenkomat concerned. The chairman received the
numerical requirements for manpower from each of the branches of the military,
and was directly responsible for filling those requirements. The chairman
must fulfill these requirements, and failure to do so would bring considerable
trouble to the chairman. Fulfilling these requirements was difficult, as some
people, in particular armament industry workers, had deferments (bronya). The
25X6 chairman must locate a replacement for each person who holds a deferment.

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